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COMPULSORY BAR DUES IN MONTANA: TWO (AND
A HALF) CHALLENGES
Jim Reynolds
Since the morning of recorded Time there have been two conflict-
ing and violently contending theories of control: One functions
through understanding, cooperation, liberty of thought, and a will-
ingness to conform to accepted rules of conduct. The other theory
relies upon force, capricious will, dogmatic expedition of purpose,
and the tyranny coexisting with entrenched power.'
It has now been three years since the Montana supreme court
adopted a constitution and by-laws to govern a newly-created judi-
cial branch adjunct, the State Bar of Montana.' In its order, the
court set forth a schedule of annual dues and assessments to be paid
by active members of the State Bar 3 in addition to the existing
annual license tax paid to the clerk of the supreme court under
legislative directive.4 The right of an attorney to practice law in
Montana is contingent on the payment of these dues.5 Thus, an
attorney, otherwise qualified to practice law, may not do so unless
and until he or she has paid the compulsory dues.
The effort to unify the state bar and to impose the attendant
compulsory fees did not go unchallenged;' neither has the fact of
unification quieted the critics.7 None of the arguments advanced to
1. In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 40, 259 S.W.2d 144, 147 (1953) (Griffin Smith,
C.J., dissenting).
2. In re the Unified Bar of Montana, 165 Mont. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 765, 765 (1975). Although
the court issued the order adopting the constitution and by-laws on January 23, 1975, it had
ordered the unification of the Montana Bar nearly a year earlier on January 29, 1974. Applica-
tion of the President of the Montana Bar Association, 163 Mont. 523, 526, 518 P.2d 32, 33-34
(1974).
3. BY-LAws OF THE STATE BAR, art. I, § 4(a). The assessments are for a client security
fund established at the same time.
4. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 93-2010.
The annual license tax under this statute is a flat $10 per year.
5. CONST. OF STATE BAR, art. II; BY-LAWS OF STATE BAR, art. I, § 4(b).
6. See Application of the President of the Montana Bar Association, 163 Mont. 523, 525,
518 P.2d 32, 33 (1974):
Arguments advanced by opponents of unification include: (1) no necessity exists
for unification; (2) compulsory membership deprives an attorney of the fundamen-
tal liberty of freedom of choice; (3) conditions have not changed since the last denial
of unification in Montana; (4) workable and proven rules for admission to practice
and the conduct of attorneys exist outside the framework of unification; and (5)
unification deprives an attorney of his property without due process of law and
places him in a condition of involuntary servitude in violation of constitutional
guarantees.
7. See, e.g., In re Petition of Morris, - Mont.... . 575 P.2d 37, 38 (1978)
(collection of dues by state bar unlawful delegation of court's power, inter alia); Douglas v.
State Bar, Civ. No. 13644 (Mont., filed Aug. 9, 1976) (amendment to by-laws by State Bar
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date, however, has caused the Montana supreme court to retreat
from its order unifying the bar and levying compulsory membership
dues on every resident attorney in the state.
This article will present yet two more arguments against these
compulsory dues and examine them with specific reference to Mon-
tana's constitution and case law. In addition, the article will exam-
ine the potential effect of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision, A bood v. Detroit Board of Education, I on future bar activi-
ties.
As the discussion herein is styled as a challenge to the existing
compulsory bar dues, rigid objectivity has been sacrificed to a de-
gree. Nevertheless, the author feels the arguments presented raise
serious questions and are presented fairly and accurately. In any
case, the author agrees with the current president of the State Bar
of Montana that: "Mandatory membership in anything must be
well justified."' If anything said in this article provokes discussion
as to whether membership in the State Bar can or should be manda-
tory, the author has accomplished his purpose.
CHALLENGE NUMBER I:
Are Compulsory Bar Dues Valid?
[Lievying money for or to the use of the crown by pretense of
prerogative, without grant of parliament for longer time, or in
other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal."0
"As developed in the United States, integration [unification]
of the bar refers to the establishment . . . of a government sanc-
increasing dues unlawful); Mahan, From the President, Mont. Law., June, 1977, at 4; Toole,
From the President, Mont. Law., Dec., 1977, at 4.
8. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
9. Toole, From the President, Mont. Law., Dec., 1977, at 4.
10. Act of 1688 for "declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the
succession of the crown" as cited in, State ex rel. Journal Publishing Co. v. Kenney, 9 Mont.
389, 396, 24 P. 96, 97 (1890). Accord, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
556 (1895):
The men who framed and adopted [the Constitution] had just emerged from
the struggle for independence whose rallying cry had been that "taxation and
representation go together."
The mother country had taught the colonists, in the contests waged to establish
that taxes could not be imposed by the sovereign except as they were granted by
the representatives of the realm, that self-taxation constituted the main security
against oppression. As Burke declared, in his speech on Conciliation with America,
the defenders of the excellence of the English constitution "took infinite pains to
inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that, in all monarchies, the people must, in
effect, themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power of granting their
own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist." The principle was that the
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tioned, dues-paying organization of all lawyers admitted to practice
in a state."" In Montana, integration has resulted in the same
thing:
Membership in the State Bar of Montana is a condition to practic-
ing law in this state. Non-payment of membership dues and as-
sessments shall result in suspension of membership and the right
to practice law until payment of all dues, assessments, and penal-
ties in the manner provided in the by-laws."
The Montana supreme court has defined "license" as meaning:
[A] right or permission granted by some competent authority to
carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would
be illegal. It is a formal or official permit or permission to carry on
some business or do some act which, without the license, would be
unlawful .... '3
That the payment of a compulsory fee is the purchase of the
right to follow one's chosen occupation or calling has been recog-
nized numerous times in Montana:
The license fee ... is the purchase of the privilege of engaging in
the occupation of selling goods, wares, and merchandise, just as
may be exacted in the case of the auctioneer, peddler, saloon-
keeper, or other trade or profession. 4
Compulsory membership dues in an integrated state bar have
specifically been termed license fees or taxes by the United States
Supreme Court 5 and by supreme courts of other states."
11. Application of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 140 Mont. 101, 105,368 P.2d 158, 161 (1962);
In re Unification of the New Hampshire Bar, 109 N.H. 260, 262, 248 A.2d 709, 711 (1968).
12. CONST. OF STATE BAR, art. H, as adopted by the Montana supreme court in In re
Unified Bar of Montana, 165 Mont. 1, 3, 530 P.2d 765, 765 (1975).
13. Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 110 Mont. 5, 19, 99 P.2d 229, 234
(1940). Accord, Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 332, 248 P.2d 879, 883 (1952); Barber
Examiners v. Walker, 67 Ariz. 156, 167, 192 P.2d 723, 730-31 (1948); Blatz Brewing Co. v.
Collins, 69 Cal. App. 2d 639, 160 P.2d 37, 39 (1945); State ex rel. Peterson v. Woodruff, 179
Or. 640, 646, 173 P.2d 961, 964 (1946).
14. Territory v. Farnsworth, 5 Mont. 303, 318, 5 P. 869, 875 (1885). See also Peter Kiewit
Sons' Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 P.2d 102 (1973); State ex rel.
Schultz-Lindsay Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 145 Mont. 380, 403 P.2d 635 (1965);
Stephen v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 175 P.2d 408 (1946); Standard Oil Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 110 Mont. 5, 99 P.2d 229 (1940); State v. Bays, 100 Mont. 125, 47 P.2d
50 (1935); Norum v. Ohio Oil Co., 83 Mont. 353, 272 P. 534 (1928); State v. McKinney, 29
Mont. 375, 74 P. 1095 (1904); State ex rel. Toi v. French, 17 Mont. 54, 41 P. 1078 (1895).
15. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 844 (1961).
16. E.g., In the Matter of Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 802, 483 S.W.2d
174, 175 (1972); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 104, 166 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1969); In re
Mundy, 202 La. 41, 50, 11 So. 2d 398, 400 (1942); Mississippi State Bar v. Collins, 214 Miss.
782, 803, 59 So. 2d 351, 356 (1952), In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 561, 4 P.2d 643, 649 (1931);
Sweeney v. Cannon, 23 App. Div. 2d 1, 4, 258 N.Y.S.2d183, 187 (1965); Petition of Rhode
Island Bar Association, - R.I. -, 374 A.:d 802, 803 (1977); Lathrop v. Donohue, 10
Wis.2d 230, 238, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (1960) aff'd 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
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Judicial characterization of license fees has varied throughout
Montana's history. In 1885, the territorial supreme court recognized
the "right of a state to tax its own citizens for the prosecution of any
particular business or profession . . . . " Shortly thereafter, the
court moved away from defining a license fee as a tax: "A license
fee is a tax sometimes, and for some purposes. Sometimes, and for
some purposes, it is not a tax."'" Not content to leave the situation
as it stood, the court attempted some years later to distinguish the
two: "Taxes are imposed for the purpose of general revenue. License
and other fees are ordinarily imposed to cover the cost and expense
of supervision or regulation."'" Even this distinction has not com-
pletely clarified the issue. Thus, in 1965, the court again is referring
to the imposition of a "license tax" 0 and, in 1973, again recognizing
that certain occupations "may be subjected to special forms of regu-
lation or taxation through an excise or license tax."'"
Actually, the specific characterization of license fees-which
the compulsory membership dues paid to the State Bar undeniably
are2 -as either taxes for revenue or licenses for regulation is unim-
portant, for, as demonstrated hereafter, neither may be imposed by
the Montana supreme court, and, as was recognized by the court in
1949: "[a] tax by any name is just as onerous .. .and especially
so when the taxpayer ...[has] been denied and deprived of [his]
constitutional right to say 'Yea' or 'Nay' to the impressment of the
tax."2
3
The 1889 Montana constitution expressly vested in the Mon-
tana legislature the authority to impose a "license tax". 2 Although
17. Territory v. Farnsworth, 5 Mont. 303, 322, 5 P. 869, 877 (1885) quoting Nathan v.
Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73, 80 (1850) (emphasis added).
18. State ex rel. Toi v. French, 17 Mont. 54, 57, 41 P. 1078, 1079 (1895).
19. State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm. v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 407,
194 P.2d 633, 636 (1948). In the same decision, the court recognized that it "is sometimes
difficult to ascertain whether a given exaction is a revenue or regulatory measure." Id. at 408,
194 P.2d at 637.
The distinction made in the text is widely recognized. See, e.g., Foster's Inc. v. Boise
City, 63 Idaho 201, 217, 118 P.2d 721, 727-28 (1941); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
Fadely, 183 Kan. 803, 806-07, 332 P.2d 568, 571 (1958); City of Shawnee v. Reid Bros.
Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592, 593-94, 207 P.2d 779, 780 (1949); Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 447, 143 P.2d 181, 184 (1943); Western Auto Transp. Inc.
v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 368, 118 P.2d 761, 766 (1941).
20. State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 145 Mont.
380, 389, 403 P.2d 635, 641 (1965).
21. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 150-51, 505 P.2d
102, 108 (1973) (emphasis added). Undoubtedly contributing to the confusion has been the
enactment of statutes which impose license taxes on some occupations, see generally R.C.M.
1947, Title 84, chs. 10 to 26, and license fees on others, see generally R.C.M. 1947, Title 66.
22. See notes 15 and 16, and accompanying text, supra.
23. Lindeen v. Montana Liquor Control Bd., 122 Mont. 549, 555, 207 P.2d 977, 979
(1949).
24. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XII, § 1.
19781
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this express authorization was not retained in the 1972 constitution,
the convention notes to the corresponding article in the new consti-
tution,25 as well as the language of this section itself referring to
taxes being levied by the general laws,2" indicate that the intent of
the new section is to continue the legislative power to determine tax
structures." The legislative power in Montana is vested in a legisla-
ture consisting of a senate and house of representatives."8 Article III,
§ 1 of the Montana constitution provides that the power of the state
government is divided into three distinct branches-legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial-and that "[n]o person or persons charged
with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the other, except
as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."' 9 It there-
fore becomes necessary to see whether any such express authoriza-
tion exists to support the supreme court's levying compulsory mem-
bership dues in the form of license fees and taxes.
Several constitutional provisions and judicial decisions estab-
lish the extent to which the legislature is given control of the state's
taxing power and revenue. Article VIII, § 2 provides that the power
to tax, vested in the legislature by Article VIII, § 1, shall never be
surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.3° Article VIII, § 12
states that "[tihe legislature shall by law insure strict accountabil-
ity of all revenue received and money spent by the state." As the
supreme court is part of the state,3' all money received or spent by
it or by its order must be subject to strict accounting under a statute
enacted by the legislature. No such statute has been enacted. Thus,
either the legislature has been derelict in its duty or the supreme
25. MONT. CONST., art. VIII, § 1.
26. Id.
27. Id., Convention Notes.
28. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 1.
29. MONT. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). See quote in note 30, infra.
30. See also Johnson v. City of Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 373, 99 P. 1059, 1060-61
(1909):
Section 1, art. 12, of the [1889] Constitution, gives to the Legislature authority
to raise revenue by the imposition of a license tax upon persons and corporations
doing business in the state. The provisions of the Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise .... In the
absence of express words declaring the contrary rule, we must hold that the provi-
sion of section 1, art. 12 ... is prohibitory, and, the Constitution having conferred
the power upon the legislative assembly, has denied the power to any other body
But with respect to a license imposed as a police regulation the situation is
entirely different. In the absence of constitutional limitation, the Legislature,
speaking generally, is left free to deal with the subject directly or through the
agency of cities or towns ... (emphasis added).
31. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; art. VII, § 1.
[Vol. 39
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court has exceeded its constitutional authority. Neither alternative
is proper.
Interpreting the above-cited constitutional provisions are sev-
eral recent supreme court decisions. In Board of Regents v. Judge,32
the court stated that the "legislative appropriation power now ex-
tends beyond the general fund and encompasses all those public
operating funds of state government."3 A few months later, the
court stated that the "power to appropriate public funds and the
power to levy and collect taxes are identical." This was a restate-
ment of a premise set forth in 1975:
It is a basic premise of the law of taxation that the foundation for
levying and assessing a tax depends upon the existence of a valid
legislative act specifically designating the imposition of the tax.
Nothing is taxable unless clearly authorized by statute.35
The language of these constitutional provisions and court deci-
sions, clearly leaving to the legislature the power to levy taxes,
revives the questions whether the membership dues charged by the
State Bar under the supreme court's order constitute license fees for
regulation or taxes for revenue, and whether this distinction mat-
ters. It does not.
Although, in some contexts, courts have held that constitu-
tional limitations on the power to tax have no application to the
exercise of the police power under which license fees are imposed,3
never in the history of Montana has the supreme court itself indi-
cated that any branch of state government other than the legislature
could levy or authorize either a license fee for regulatory purposes
or a tax for revenue purposes.37
As early as 1885, the court stated that the "only restraint [on
the right of a state to tax its own citizens for the pursuit of any
particular profession] is found in the responsibility of the members
of the legislature to their constituents." Nineteen years later, the
court stated that the exercise of the power of designation of certain
subjects upon which license fees could be imposed rested in the
legislature. 31 Twenty-four years later, in Hale v. County Treasurer,'0
32. 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975).
33. Id. at 446, 543 P.2d at 1331 (1975) (emphasis added).
34. Huber v. Groff, - Mont. - - 558 P.2d 1124, 1126 (1976).
35. Connick v. Judge, 167 Mont. 357, 36.1, 538 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1975) (emphasis added).
36. E.g., State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402,
408, 194 P.2d 633, 637 (1948); Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash. 2d 281, 288, 280 P.2d 1038, 1043
(1955). In both cases, the question of the uniformity of the tax, not the authority of the branch
of government imposing it, was under constitutional attack.
37. Not until Application of the President of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523,
518 P.2d 32 (1974), that is.
38. Territory v. Farnsworth, 5 Mont. 303, 323, 5 P. 869, 877 (1885).
39. State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 390, 74 P. 1095, 1099 (1904).
19781
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the principle was reaffirmed: "It is within the legislative power to
define the different classes [of occupations] and to fix the license
tax required of each."' In 1946, the principle was again stated: "It
is well settled that the granting of licenses to carry on particular
businesses, occupations, trades, or callings is . . . exercised by the
legislative department of the state."' Most recently, in Peter Kiewit
Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization,3 the court conceded a
wide discretion to the legislature in the classification of occupations
subject to regulation through license taxes."
It is obvious from the above holdings that, in Montana, histori-
cally at least, the power to license occupations has rested with the
legislature, not the judiciary."
Perhaps the best answer to the question of whether a license is
a tax was given by then-Justice Lee Metcalf in his dissent in State
ex rel. State Aeronautics Commission v. Board of Examiners:'"
Without attempting an all-inclusive definition of the words
"public money" as used in our constitution, they certainly include
money raised by the state by compulsory process in order to carry
out one of its governmental purposes.
... Under these constitutional provisions, it is immaterial whether
the money is paid the state as a result of a revenue tax or is
received from a license tax imposed under the police power. It is
all income arising out of the exercise of the sovereign power of the
state and is therefore public money and subject to the constitu-
tional prohibitions.
... It is equally well recognized that the general term "taxes" is
often used indiscriminately in statutes and in state Constitutions
to mean either revenue taxes or regulatory taxes or both.
... [Ilt is apparent that the Constitution does not distinguish
between property taxes, license taxes, excise taxes, etc., but con-
templates that the word "taxes" shall be used in its broadest and
most comprehensive sense to include every charge imposed by the
sovereign power upon persons, property, or privileges.'
40. 82 Mont. 98, 265 P. 6 (1928).
41. Id. at 107, 265 P. at 9.
42. Stephens v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 371, 175 P.2d 408, 410 (1946).
43. 161 Mont. 140, 505 P.2d 102 (1973).
44. Id. at 150-51, 505 P.2d at 108.
45. Accord, In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 527, 25 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1946);
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 51, 11 N.W.2d 604, 620 (1943).
46. 121 Mont. 402, 194 P.2d 633 (1948).
47. Id. at 434-36, 194 P.2d at 650. (Metcalf, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Adair also took
a crack at defining "tax" in the same case:
A tax is a forced ... exaction [or] imposition ... by authority of a sovereign state
upon the persons or property within its jurisdiction, to provide public revenue for
[Vol. 39
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The above discussion makes abundantly clear that 1) be they
called membership dues, license fees, or regulatory taxes, the mon-
eys practicing attorneys pay to the State Bar, under compulsion by
the supreme court and under threat of forfeiture of the privilege to
practice law, are public moneys subject to all the constitutional
provisions relating to such funds, and 2) the imposition of such
compulsory dues, fees, or taxes must be by legislative act. Because
no such legislative act has been passed, it remains to be seen if
another source of authority for the supreme court's order exists.
The supreme court, in its order creating the State Bar and
levying membership dues on all practicing attorneys, relied on its
"inherent power to order unification" as established by a line of
decisions, dating from 1939, on whether the bar should be unified. 8
Without attempting a detailed analysis of these past decisions,
one could make some observations on the history of attempts to
unify the bar in Montana. First, despite five previous petitions to
the court, unification of the bar was not ordered until 1974. At the
very least, this indicates historical judicial reluctance to do so. One
reason for this reluctance was stated in the 1947 decision cited
above: "[S]ome members of this court entertain the opinion that
the integration of unification of the attorneys at law into a compul-
sory, all-inclusive organization must come through legislative and
not through judicial action."' 9
A second reason for this reluctance may be found in the court's
reliance on the opinion of the practicing bar on the question of
integration, as indicated by polls taken by the court." For instance,
the support of the government, and administration of the law, or the payment of
public expenses. Any payment exacted by the state ... as a contribution toward
the cost of maintaining governmental functions, where the special benefits derived
from their performance is merged in the general benefit, is a tax.
Id. at 425, 194 P.2d at 645. (Adair, C.J., dissenting). Accord, State ex rel. Pierce v. Gowdy,
62 Mont. 119, 126-27, 203 P. 1115, 1116 (1922); Matter of Washington State Bar Association,
86 Wash.2d 624, 638, 548 P.2d 310, 319 (1976) (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
48. Application of the President of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 524, 518 P.2d
32, 32 (1974). See In re Montana Bar, 156 Mont. 515, 485 P.2d 945 (1971); Application of the
Montana Bar Ass'n, 140 Mont. 101, 368 P.2d 158 (1962); In re Unification of the Bar of This
Court, 119 Mont. 494, 175 P.2d 773 (1947); In re Unification of the Montana Bar Association,
107 Mont. 559, 87 P.2d 172 (1939).
49. In re Unification of the Bar of This Court, 119 Mont. 494, 494, 175 P.2d 773, 773
(1947). See also In the Matter of Integration of the Bar of Hawaii, 50 Haw. 107, 107-08, 432
P.2d 887, 887 (1967) (consensus of court that matter of unification be submitted initially to
the legislature).
50. The Montana supreme court is not alone in its reliance on polls of the practicing
bar as to the advisability of unification. The Florida (Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40
So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1949)), Nebraska (In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133
Neb. 283, 284, 275 N.W. 265, 265-66 (1931)), New Hampshire (In re Unified New Hampshire
Bar, 112 N.H. 204, 205, 291 A.2d 600, 600 (1972)), and Tennesse (In re Adoption of Rule of
Court for Unification of State Bar of Tennessee, 479 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tenn. 1972)) supreme
courts all relied in part on polls taken of the practicing bar before granting or denying
19781
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in 1971, the poll conducted by the court indicated a "strong minor-
ity" of attorneys opposing unification.' No similar poll was taken
in 1974 prior to the order unifying the bar.
Secondly, those parties favoring unification appear to have
made several attempts to accomplish their goal, not only through
the court, but also through the legislature, all without success until
1974.2 That both the legislature, vested with licensing powers, and
the judiciary, vested with supervisory powers, refused to integrate
the bar for at least thirty-five years is significant. 5
Of more concern for the purposes of the challenge lodged herein,
however, is the source and extent of the inherent power of the court
to unify the bar and, more specifically, to levy compulsory member-
ship dues.
The only constitutional provision that supports the court's ac-
tion is Article VII, § 2(3) which provides that the supreme court
"may make rules governing appellate procedure, practice and pro-
cedure for all other courts, admission to the bar and the conduct of
its mem bers. "51 To date, no decision of the supreme court has inter-
preted the emphasized language." A recent decision, however, indi-
cates the way in which this language and the language of the other
constitutional provisions cited herein should be construed. In speak-
ing of the delineation of constitutional powers between the Board
of Regents and the legislature, the court stated:
As noted above, the Regents are not mentioned in either Article
III, Section 1, which creates the three branches of government, nor
in Article V, which limits the powers of the legislature. Similarly,
petitions for unification. See also Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195,
201, 12 N.W.2d 515, 519 (1943):
[Tihe beneficial results ... can be attained and the evils avoided only if the order
prayed for receives the wholehearted support of a decided majority of the bar ....
Accord, In re Unification of Bar of Arkansas, 247 Ark. 926, 927, 448 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1970).
51. In re Montana Bar, 156 Mont. 515, 518, 485 P.2d 945, 946 (1971).
52. See Application of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 140 Mont. 101, 104, 368 P.2d 158, 160
(1962); In re Unification of Montana Bar Ass'n, 107 Mont. 559, 570, 87 P.2d 172, 176 (1939)
(Morris, J., dissenting).
53. As stated by Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme Court in the famous
Dred Scott decision:
No change in public opinion on questions of public policy can ever be given any
weight in construing the provisions of a constitution where the meaning is clear,
for the adoption of a constitution that might be deemed wise at one time and unwise
at another would abrogate the judicial character of the court and make it the reflex
of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856) as quoted in State ex rel. State Aeronau-
tics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 429-30, 194 P.2d 633, 647 (1948) (Adair,
C.J., dissenting).
54. MONT. COST. art. VII, § 2(3) (emphasis added).
55. The court did not mention this section in its unification order. See Application of
the President of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 518 P.2d 32 (1974).
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the legislature is not mentioned in Article X, Section 9(2) which
entrusts the government and control of the university system to the
Regents. By no rule of construction then can the powers of one be
exercised or encroached upon by the other.5"
The analogy is clear. Nowhere in any of the articles of the
Montana constitution relating to public funds or taxes is the judici-
ary or supreme court mentioned. Consequently, no rule of construc-
tion can justify the expansion of the judiciary's power to govern
admission to the bar and the conduct of its members to include the
legislative power to levy license fees. The additional constitutional
requirement of express direction or permission before one branch of
government can exercise a power properly belonging to another 7
serves as a further restriction on an overly expansive interpretation
of the judicial power.
This challenge must be answered by reference to Montana's
constitution, statutes, and case law. Unquestionably, however, the
experience and decisions of other states, where integration of the bar
was accomplished by court order without underlying legislative au-
thorization for the levying of compulsory membership dues, are val-
uable guides for determining whether such an action is proper here.58
In the overwhelming majority of states having an integrated
bar, integration was accomplished by statute alone or by a combina-
tion of authorizing statute and court order. In only eight of the
thirty-two states having a unified bar was the integration accom-
plished by court order alone.59 In one of these eight states, Okla-
homa, a statute authorizing integration had been repealed just prior
to the court order. 0 Eighteen states do not have integrated bars.6 '
The challenge presented herein has been leveled at the court
orders unifying the bar in other states and answered in a variety of
ways.
The supreme courts of Hawaii,6" Nebraska, 3 and Tennessee'
56. Board of Regents v. Judge, 163 Mont. 433, 451, 543 P.2d 1323, 1331 (1975). See also
State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 429, 194 P.2d
633, 647 (1948) (Adair, C.J., dissenting):
We are mindful, too, that the declarations of Constitutions are placed therein to
be obeyed, and are not to be frittered away by construction. Our duty in this respect
remains the same no matter how urgent may be the desire to obtain money with
which to carry on the much-needed program.
57. MONT. CONST. art. I, § 1.
58. See In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 36, 259 S.W.2d 144, 146 (1953).
59. See Appendix I.
60. In re Integration of the State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 505, 95 P.2d 113, 113
(1939).
61. See Appendix I.
62. In re Integration of the Bar of Hawaii, 50 Haw. 107, 108, 432 P.2d 887, 888 (1967).
The Hawaii supreme court, although holding it had the "inherent power" to do so, has not
yet ordered integration. See also note 49, supra.
19781
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relied on the same undefined "inherent power" relied on by the
Montana supreme court. The supreme courts of Arkansas 5 and
Florida66 used similar reasoning. In Petition of Florida State Bar
Association,"7 the Florida supreme court recognized that "[i]f the
membership fee could on any sound basis be construed as a tax,
undoubtedly it should be imposed by the legislature under its police
power."" The court then justified its imposition of compulsory dues:
[T]he power to regulate may carry with it the imposition of a
charge for that purpose. . . .We think the doctrine of implied
powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such an
exaction.69
The Arkansas court, in reaching the same result, relied on
"necessary implication" from "the imposition of duty of regulation"
to find the power to impose an annual license fee. 0
This approach runs exactly contrary to the Montana constitu-
tion's requirement that powers properly belonging to one branch of
government may be exercised by another branch only if "expressly
directed or permitted" in the constitution." No express permission
or direction is given to the Montana supreme court to exercise the
legislative power to levy license fees.
The majority positions of the Florida and Arkansas supreme
courts stated above did not go unchallenged by members of those
courts who disagreed." Thus, in Florida, Justice Barns dissented,
stating that:
For this Court to compel or coerce membership of the attorneys in
an "integrated bar" association and to prescribe dues to be paid
63. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, 289, 275 N.W.
265, 268 (1931).
64. Petition of Tennessee Bar Association, 532 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tenn. 1975). The
Tennessee supreme court, although holding it had the "inherent power" to do so, has not yet
ordered integration.
65. In the Matter of Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 802, 483 S.W.2d 174,
175 (1972).
66. Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1949).
67. 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
68. Id. at 906.
69. Id. at 906-07.
70. In the Matter of Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 802, 483 S.W.2d 174,
175 (1972).
71. MONT. CONST. art. m, § 1 (emphasis added).
72. Indeed, throughout the history of efforts to integrate state bars, there have been
eloquent spokespersons speaking out in dissent. See, e.g., In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark.
35, 39, 259 S.W.2d 144, 147 (1953) (Griffin Smith, C.J., dissenting); In re Unification of the
New Hampshire Bar, 109 N.H. 260, 269, 248 A.2d 709, 715 (1968) (Grimes, J., dissenting);
Kelly v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 283, 298 P. 623, 625 (1931) (Clark, V.C.J., dissenting);
Matter of Washington State Bar Association, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 634, 548 P.2d 310, 318-19
(1976) (Rossellini, J., dissenting); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 55, 11 N.W.2d 605,
625-26 (1943) (Fowler, J., dissenting).
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by the members simply means that this Court is attempting to levy
a tax, and the judiciary cannot lawfully levy a tax, by whatever
name it may be called.7"
In Arkansas, it was Justice McFaddin, who dissented as fol-
lows:
Polish and paint the proposal as much as you will, the hard fact
remains that this "integration" is a form of taxation which will be
required for the privilege of being a licensed attorney .... 1,
Finally, as to the proper division of authority between the legis-
lative and judicial branches regarding the licensing and regulating
of the bar of Montana, perhaps the best answer is contained in a
recent Washington state decision:
The court's power with respect to attorneys is the power to admit,
to discipline, and to disbar. Inherent in this power is the power to
prescribe qualifications and standards. But the imposing of license
fees is a legislative function.7"
There is no reason why the activities of the State Bar, to the
extent they are designed to achieve a legitimate public purpose,
should not be supported by a tax or license fee authorized by the
legislature. "The executive depends on the legislature for funding
.. . ' The supreme court itself is dependent on the legislature
for its operating funds.77 Why should not an adjunct of the su-
preme court be similarly funded? Can the supreme court exercise
powers to fund the State Bar which it (the supreme court) could not
exercise on its own behalf? Surely the answer must be "no."
One of the most carefully guarded and hard won rights guaran-
teed by our constitution is the right to have the legislature examine
the financial structure of the state each two years and, having as-
sessed the needs of each branch of government, go on record by
taking affirmative action respecting the collection and expenditure
of public funds extracted from the pockets of the taxpayers.7 8 The
system created by the supreme court by judicial edict substituting
court-imposed license fees paid to a court-created agency is not only
repugnant to our system, but dangerous to our form of 'government.79
73. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 909 (Fla. 1949) (Barns, J.,
dissenting).
74. In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 44, 259 S.W;2d 144, 149 (1953) (McFaddin,
J., dissenting).
75. Matter of Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 640, 548 P.2d 310, 320
(1976) (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
76. Huber v. Groff, - Mont. 558 P.2d 1124, 1131 (1976).
77. E.g., Laws of Montana 1977, House Bills 143, 145.
78. State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 433,
194 P.2d 633, 649 (1948) (Adair, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 431, 194 P.2d at 648.
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The controls on legislative malfeasance developed over centuries of
refinement by trial and error simply are not present in cases of
judicial malfeasance. Supreme court justices are elected to adjudi-
cate, not to legislate. The Montana constitution demands that they
remain within their sphere of power.
In his concurring opinion in Lathrop v. Donohue, s0 the leading
United States Supreme Court opinion on integration of state bars,
Justice Harlan asked this rhetorical question:
Or could it be that the Federal Constitution requires a separation
of state powers according to which a state legislature can tax and
set up commissions but a state judiciary cannot do these things?"'
A federal constitution may not require sucha separation of powers.
The Montana constitution explicitly does.
CHALLENGE NUMBER H:
Are Compulsory Bar Dues Excessive?
Our government was not designed to be paternal in form ....
[Tihe paternal theory of government is odious, and we should not
treat lightly or disregard the sacred rights recognized and guaran-
teed by the Constitution. 2
If one concludes" that the compulsory membership fee in the
State Bar exacted by the 1975 order of the Montana supreme court
is a fee for regulation imposed under the police power rather than a
tax for revenue imposed under the taxing power, then other consid-
erations arise.9
The police power of a state is to be exercised only for the pur-
pose of promoting the public welfare,15 and unless its exercise is to
prevent manifest evil, or to insure the public welfare, the propriety
of such exercise may be a matter for serious debate." As noted by
Justice Cooper of the Montana supreme court:
80. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). The case arose in Wisconsin which has a statute authorizing
integration.
81. Id. at 865 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. Garden Spot Market, Inc. v. Byrne, 141 Mont. 382, 394, 378 P.2d 220, 227 (1963)
(citations omitted).
83. This has been the view of most courts when faced with the challenge. See, e.g., In
re Member of Bar, 257 A.2d 382, 384 (Del. 1969); Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So.
2d 902, 906-07 (Fla. 1949); Petition of Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, - R.I .... 374 A.2d
802, 803 (1977).
84. Johnson v. City of Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 373-75, 99 P. 1059, 1061 (1909). See
note 35 and accompanying text, supra. See.also State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v.
Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 408, 194 P.2d 633, 637 (1948): "[I]t is sometimes
difficult to ascertain whether a given exaction is a revenue or regulatory measure."
85. State ex rel. Pierce v. Gowdy, 62 Mont. 119, 128-29, 203 P. 1115, 1117 (1922).
86. Id. at 131, 203 P. at 1118 (Cooper, J., concurring).
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Necessary as it undoubtedly is to raise revenue sufficient for the
maintenance of the state, the authority must be exercised with
delicate caution and within the precise limits found in the funda-
mental law which creates the power and defines its extent. The
pressing needs of the state are not to be satisfied at the expense of
guaranties indispensable to the constitutional government of a free
people. 7
The Montana constitution does not specify which branch of
government is the proper custodian of the police power of Mon-
tana." Courts in other states, however, have held that, while the
police power is generally considered an exclusive power of the legis-
lature, 9 it may be exercised by the courts. 0
No matter which department of the government exercises the
power, the limits on it remain the same. In the exercise of its police
power, the state may exact from the practitioners of the profession
the reasonable cost of supervision and regulation of the profession
concerned." Although the state is neither bound to adjust the
charge after the fact, 2 nor is it tied to mathematical certainty in
establishing the exactions, 3 the charge levied must be commensur-
ate with the costs of issuing the license and regulating the profes-
sion. In other words, if the imposition clearly and materially ex-
ceeds the cost of regulation, inspection or police control, it is gener-
87. Id.
88. State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 407-
08, 194 P.2d 633, 637 (1948).
89. In Montana, the power has, with the single exception of the unification of the State
Bar, apparently always been exercised by the legislature. See, e.g., Garden Spot Market, Inc.
v. Byrne, 141 Mont. 382, 396-97, 378 P.2d 220, 228 (1963); Brackman v. Kruse, 122 Mont.
91, 103-04, 199 P.2d 971, 977 (1948); State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v. Glacier Park
Co., 118 Mont. 205, 214, 164 P.2d 366, 370 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 110 Mont. 5, 17-18, 99 P.2d 229, 233 (1940); State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police
Court, 68 Mont. 435, 442-43, 219 P. 810, 812 (1923); Johnson v. City of Great Falls, 38 Mont.
369, 373-75, 99 P. 1059, 1061 (1909).
90. E.g., Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 906 (Fla. 1949); Lathrop v.
Donohue, 10 Wis.2d 230, 241, 102 N.W.2d 404, 410 (1960) aff'd 367 U.S. 820 (1961). Both cases
involved challnges to court-imposed compulsory bar membership dues.
91. Great Northern Ry. v. State of Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 159-60 (1937).
92. Id. at 159.
93. Urban v. Riley, 21 Cal. 2d 232, 131 P.2d 4, 6 (1942); Western Auto Transports v.
City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 368, 118 P.2d 761, 766 (1941).
94. Brackman v. Kruse, 122 Mont. 91, 104, 199 P.2d 971, 977 (1948); State ex rel. City
of Bozeman v. Police Court, 68 Mont. 435, 442-43, 219 P. 810, 812 (1923). Accord, Gospel
Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704, 714 (1945); Foster's Inc. v. Boise
City, 63 Idaho 201, 217, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Fadely,
183 Kan. 803, 806-07, 332 P.2d 568, 571 (1958); City of Lovington v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 145,
359 P.2d 769, 770 (1961); City of Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592, 594,
207 P.2d 779, 780 (1949); Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Or. 603, 613, 243 P.2d
1060, 1065 (1952); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 448, 143
P.2d 181, 184 (1943).
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ally held to be a tax or an illegal exercise of the police power.' That
the fee charged produces more revenue than the actual cost and
expense of the enforcement and supervision fails as an adequate
objection to the exaction of the fees,9" but if the amount of a license
fee is grossly disproportionate to the sum required to pay the cost
of due regulation of the business, the license fee will be struck
down.97 Clearly, a state, under the guise of police power regulation,
cannot impose a revenue-producing tax." The presumption is that
the imposition is valid," but
[s]uch an [imposition] may, in spite of the presumption of valid-
ity, show on its face that some part of the exactions is to be used
for a purpose other than the legitimate one of supervision and
regulation and may, for that reason, be void. And a statute fair
upon its face may be shown to be void and unenforceable on ac-
count of its actual operation. 1'"
In the latter case, the burden is on the complainant to show the act
is unreasonable. 0'
The applicability of these general rules to the regulation of the
practice of law has been established. 02 Thus, the practice of law is
a fit subject for legislative and judicial regulation, 03 and the com-
95. Garden Spot Market, Inc. v. Byrne, 141 Mont. 382, 398-99, 378 P.2d 220, 229 (1963);
State ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Equalization, 121 Mont. 402, 408, 194
P.2d 633, 637 (1948). Accord, City of Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592,
594, 207 P.2d 779, 781 (1949); Starker v. Scott, 183 Or. 10, 15-16, 190 P.2d 532, 535 (1948).
96. Glodt v. City of Missoula, 121 Mont. 178, 186, 190 P.2d 545, 549 (1948); State ex
ret. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 408, 194 P.2d 633, 637
(1948); State v. Pepper, 70 Mont. 596, 605-06, 226 P. 1108, 1110 (1924). Accord, Urban v.
Riley, 21 Cal.2d 232, -, 131 P.2d 4, 6 (1942); Houston v. Kirshwing, 117 Colo. 92, 98, 184
P.2d 487, 490 (1947); Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 219, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941);
City of Lovington v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 145, 359 P.2d 769, 770-71 (1961).
97. Great Northern Ry v. State of Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 161 (1937); Brackman v.
Kruse, 122 Mont. 91, 104, 199 P.2d 971, 977 (1948); City of Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing
Co., 201 Okla. 592, 594, 207 P.2d 779, 781 (1949).
98. Brackman v. Kruse, 122 Mont. 91, 112-13, 199 P.2d 971,982 (1948); State v. Pepper,
70 Mont. 596, 605-06, 226 P. 1108, 1111 (1924). Accord, Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho
201, 217, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941); City of Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla.
592, 594, 207 P.2d 779, 780 (1949); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo.
437, 447, 143 P.2d 181, 184 (1943).
99. Great Northern Ry. v. State of Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 160 (1937). Accord, State
ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Court, 68 Mont. 435, 441-42, 291 P. 810, 812 (1923); Starker
v. Scott, 183 Or. 10, 16, 190 P.2d 532, 535 (1948).
100. Great Northern Ry. v. State of Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1937).
101. State v. Pepper, 70 Mont. 596, 606-07, 226 P. 1108, 1111 (1924); City of Shawnee
v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592, 594, 207 P.2d 779, 781 (1949).
102. E.g., Hulbert v. Mybeck, 220 Ind. 530, 533, 44 N.E.2d 830, 831 (1942); Goer v.
Taylor, 51 N.D. 792, 798, 200 N.W. 898, 899 (1924); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 44,
11 N.W.2d 604, 620 (1943).
103. Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 1954); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102,
109, 166 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1969); In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 50, 11 So. 2d 398, 400 (1942); Board
of Comm'rs. v. Collins, 214 Miss. 782, 800, 59 So. 2d 351, 355 (1952); State ex rel. Nebraska
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pulsory bar dues are viewed as exactions for regulatory purposes.104
As such, the exactions must be commensurate with the legitimate
costs of supervision and regulation. 05 That the level of compulsory
bar dues in Montana far exceeds the level of expenses incurred in
the supervision and regulation of the bar is the basis for this chal-
lenge to these compulsory dues.
While a complete examination of bar income and expenditures
is beyond the scope of this article, a few salient features of the
financial status of the State Bar will illustrate the evidence for this
challenge.
Initially, it must be emphasized again that regulatory exactions
must be for the legitimate costs of supervision and regulation.'"1 In
its order unifying the bar, the Montana supreme court specifically
retained "original and exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement or
professional ethics and conduct of members of the Unified Bar of
Montana."'0' The court also retained the already existing Commis-
sion on Practice to assist it in handling discipline and disbarment
matters.08 That this leaves the State Bar with precious few regula-
tory and supervisory duties, outside the collection of the mandatory
dues, is obvious.' 9 Under this view, whether any regulatory fees
should be paid to the State Bar is a matter of serious debate."0
Assuming that the State Bar does perform some regulatory
function and that all of its funds are expended to meet the costs thus
State Bar Ass'n v. Merten, 142 Neb. 780, 785-86, 7 N.W.2d 874, 877 (1943); In re Platz, 60
Nev. 296, 306, 108 P.2d 858, 863 (1940); In re Unification of the New Hampshire Bar, 109
N.H. 260, 264, 248 A.2d 709, 712 (1968); In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 556-57, 4 P.2d 643, 647
(1931); In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 506, 95 P.2d 113, 114 (1939);
Matter of Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 548 P.2d 310, 315 (1976).
104. See BY-LAws oF STATE BAs, art. I, § 4(a): "The dues shall constitute a fund for
the payment of the expenses of the association." Accord, Herron v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 53,
-, 147 P.2d 543, 549 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n,
40 So. 2d 902, 907 (1949); In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 562, 4 P.2d 643, 649 (1931); Goer v.
Taylor, 51 N.D. 792, 800, 200 N.W. 898, 900 (1924); Kelly v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 282,
298 P. 623, 624 (1931); Petition of Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, __ R.I ...... 374 A.2d
802, 803 (1977).
105. Great Northern Ry. v. State of Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 161 (1937); Goer v.
Taylor, 51 N.D. 792, 798, 200 N.W. 898, 899-900 (1924); Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 532
S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tenn. 1975).
106. See caees cited at notes 93 and 99 and accompanying text, supra.
107. Application of President of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 528, 518 P.2d
32, 34 (1974). Accord, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2026.
108. Application of President of the Montana Bar Ass'n, 163 Mont. 523, 528, 518 P.2d
32, 34 (1974).
109. Toole, From the President, Mont. Law., Dec., 1977, at 4; Mahan, From the
President, Mont. Law., Feb., 1977, at 4. See also Kelly v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 284, 298
P. 623, 625 (1931) (Clark, V.C.J., dissenting): "[Tihe number of unethical and unfaithful
attorneys in this state is negligible, and to require each attorney in this state to pay a fee
that a board of governors may be maintained is an unnecessary expense."
110. This was one of the main contentions in the unsuccessful petition of William
Morris. In re Petition of Morris, - Mont. -, 575 P.2d 37 (1978).
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incurred, there is still a major discrepancy between the dues paid
and the cost of regulation. In fiscal year 1977, the State Bar had
income from all sources"' of $188,575, including $118,035 in mem-
bership dues."' The total expenses incurred for the year came to
$154,438."'' This left a total net income for the year of $34,137 or
18.1% of total income and fully 28.9%-nearly one-third-of the
members' dues paid."'
The above calculations are based on the assumption that all of
bar expenses are incurred pursuant to its regulatory functions. A
glance at the income statement reveals the fallacy of this assump-
tion. Some items may be readily challenged as not having anything
to do with regulation, although they may be beneficial otherwise:" 5
ITEM EXPENDITURE
The Montana Lawyer"' $ 9,002
The Montana Law Review 12,697
Continuing Legal Education"7  9,466
Legislative Expense ' 8  7,005' 9
TOTAL $38,170
Reducing the above-stated total expenses by the total of these
clearly non-regulatory expenses raises the degree to which total in-
come of the State Bar exceeds total legitimate expenses. With these
four items eliminated, net income for the year would have been
$72,307, 38.3% of total income and 61.3% of members' dues paid.' 0
Neither are possible reductions of improper expenses limited to
the above. By far the largest group of expenses incurred by the State
Bar were the administrative expenses of the state office, totalling
111. In considering the reasonableness of a regulatory exaction, it is well established
that one may look to other sources of funds available to the regulatory agency. See City of
Shawnee v. Reid Bros. Plumbing Co., 201 Okla. 592, 207 P.2d 779 (1949).
112. State Bar of Montana, Income Statement Detail, as reproduced in Mont. Law.,
Oct., 1977, at 11.
113. Id.
114. In fiscal year 1976, the comparable net to gross and net to members' dues paid
ratios were even higher: 31.9% of total income ($53,220 net income/$166,645 total income) and
45.5% of members' dues paid ($53,220 net income/$114,490 members' dues). State Bar of
Montana, Income Statement Detail, as reproduced in Mont. Law., Sept., 1976, at 10.
115. See quote at note 82, supra.
116. But see Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 555-56, 132 S.E.2d 292, 298-99 (1963).
117. As the seminars and services offered under this program are not mandatory, it is
difficult to see the regulatory or supervisory aspect of them. But see Lathrop v. Donohue, 10
Wis.2d 230, 246, 102 N.W.2d 404, 413 (1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
118. See discussion under CHALLENGE NuMma II (1/2), infra.
119. All figures from State Bar of Montana, Income Statement Detail, as reproduced
in Mont. Law., Oct., 1977, at 10.
120. Cf. Brackman v. Kruse, 122 Mont. 91, 106, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (1948) (license fees
collected exceeded the cost of regulation an average of 853% a year for ten years).
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$83,037.-11 For the money, what are the executive director and staff
doing? Statements excerpted from the Montana Lawyer give some
indications:
The State Bar Executive Offices will be the central source for
legislative lobbying and statements to be made before the Mon-
tana Legislature in 1977, and in the Congress. Through the execu-
tive offices, members of the State Bar will receive regular reports
through a legislative reporting service informing members of the
Bar of all developments in legislative matters. 22
You should have now received information regarding the Bar
sponsored trip to Scandinavia.'2
The State Bar staff is administering group life and health
insurance programs which are extremely competitive and of real
value to you and your family. 2 4
These excerpts are not intended to indicate that the executive
director or his staff are guilty of malfeasance in office or dereliction
of duty. They do indicate that, at least part of the time, they are
engaged in matters not even remotely connected to the regulation
of the practice of law. The part of their salary paid for this portion
of their time should not be borne by the compulsory membership
dues paid to the State Bar as regulatory exactions.
Finally, the increases in the members' dues over the three years
of the State Bar's existence warrant mention.'2 In its initial order
adopting membership dues, the supreme court established a sched-
ule of dues ranging from $5 per year for a member admitted to
practice for less than one year to a maximum of $40 per year for a
member admitted to practice for more than three years. 2 In the
three years since that order, these minimum and maximum dues
have been raised respectively to $40 and $100 per year,'12 an increase
respectively of 800% and 250%. One may well ask: has the historical
efficiency of the supreme court and its attorneys so changed for the
worse as to require such an increase in funds just to control the rare
errant attorney?'2 Or have the numbers of unethical and unfaithful
121. State Bar of Montana, Income Statement Detail, as reproduced in Mont. Law.,
Oct., 1977, at 11.
122. Parcell, From the Executive Director, Mont. Law., Jan., 1976, at 4.
123. Parcell, From the Executive Director, Mont. Law., March, 1976, at 4.
124. Parcell, From the Executive Director, Mont. Law., Sept., 1976, at 7.
125. See Douglas v. State Bar, Civ. No. 13644 (Mont., filed Aug. 9, 1976).
126. In re Unified Bar of Montana, 165 Mont. 1, 8, 530 P.2d 765, 768 (1975) (codified
at BY-LAWS OF STATE BAR, art. I, § 4(a)).
127. BY-LAWS OF STATE BAR, art. I, § 4(a). For comparison, the cost of living, as mea-
sured by the Consumer Price Index, rose only 13% between January, 1975, and July, 1977.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor as reported in WoRLD ALAMNAC 46 (1978).
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attorneys in this state so increased in the last three years as to
justify each attorney in the state having to pay at least a two-and-
one-half-fold increase in fees to regulate them?'1 If so, the State Bar
is a dismal failure at its only constitutionally permissible task of
regulating and supervising the practice of law. If not, then the
spread between the actual cost of administration and the amount
of fees collected is so great as to evidence on its face a void revenue
measure, rather than a valid regulatory measure.'13
CHALLENGE NUMBER I (1/2):.31
Are Compulsory Bar Dues Improperly Used?
[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyranni-
cal. '32
As noted in the last section, the State Bar of Montana main-
tains an active legislative effort,'3 3 which, in fiscal year 1977, spent
$7,005 of the State Bar's funds in lobbying before the Montana
legislature.'1 Among the thirty bills followed by the State Bar
'1
were proposals to make the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions applicable to minors;' 3 to establish a comprehensive title in-
surance code; 3 ' to define the obligations of a health care provider;'
3
1
to establish a system of no-fault vehicle insurance;' 39 and to make
uniform the application of the homestead allowance.141
This selection of legislation was chosen to make a point: not all
of the legislation supported or opposed by the State Bar in the 1977
Montana Legislature involved matters even tangentially related to
its function of supervising or regulating the practice of law.
The importance of this point is underscored by a recent United
129. See Kelly v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 284, 298 P. 623, 625 (1931) (Clark, V.C.J.,
dissenting).
130. Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 219, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941).
131. The numbering of this section was adopted because of the similarity between this
section and the previous one and because the discussion herein has only tentatively been
applied to the issue of compulsory bar dues expenditures.
132. Thomas Jefferson as quoted in I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALST 354
(1948) as quoted in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977).
133. See notes 117 and 121 and accompanying text, supra.
134. State Bar of Montana, Income Statement Detail, as reproduced in Mont. Law.,
Oct., 1977, at 11.
135. As indicated by State Bar of Montana, Legislative Status Report, Mont. Law.,
March, 1977, at 10-11.
136. H.201, 45th Mont. Legis. (1977) (opposed by State Bar: Killed).
137. H.413, 45th Mont. Legis. (1977) (State Bar withdrew opposition: Killed).
138. H.567, 45th Mont. Legis. (1977) (opposed by State Bar: Killed).
139. H.739, 45th Mont. Legis. (1977) (opposed by State.Bar: Killed).
140. Laws of Montana 1977, ch. 153 (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-401) (supported
by State Bar).
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States Supreme Court decision, Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,"' in which non-union members, required to pay to the
union, as a condition of employment, a service fee equal in amount
to union dues, had challenged the union's spending a part of their
required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargain-
ing representative.
In upholding their challenge, the Court stated:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds
for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candi-
dates, or towards the advancement of other ideological causes not
germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative.
Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be
financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced
into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental
employment."'
Although the Court was expressing only the convictions of
some lower court justices,' the ramifications of the decision have
shaken the integrated bar structure:'"
If this principle were extended fully to unified bars, it would dises-
tablish them for all but their competence and discipline functions,
leaving lawyers free to support or ignore bar social or political
efforts as they wish."'
141. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
142. Id. at 235-36. The appellants had also alleged that the union sponsored social
activities which were not open to nonmembers. The Court intimated that to the extent that
these activities fell outside the union's duties as exclusive representative, they could not be
paid out of objecting members' dues. Id. at 236 n. 33.
143. E.g., In re Unified New Hampshire Bar, 112 N.H. 204,207, 291 A.2d 600, 602 (1972)
(Grimes, J., dissenting): "I cannot cast my vote to compel all lawyers to belong to and
financially support an association which may espouse causes with which they may disagree."
144. Another reason for concern among integrated bar devotees was the Court's treat-
ment in Abood of Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), which for seventeen years stood
as the definitive statement of the Court in favor of integrated bars. The Abood Court, how-
ever, seemed to regard it more lightly:
The only proposition about which a majority of the Court in Lathrop agreed was
that the constitutional issues should be reached. However, due to the disparate
views of those five Justices on the merits and the failure of the other four Members
of the Court to discuss the constitutional questions, Lathrop does not provide a
clear holding to guide us in adjudicating the constitutional question here presented.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 233 n. 29 (1977).
145. Woytash, Unified Bars Are Under Siege, BAR LEADER, Nov./Dec., 1977, at 33
[hereinafter cited as Woytash]. Woytash also reports on the running dispute the State Bar
of California is having with Governor Brown, id. at 35-36, and the successful effort to include
the legislature-created State Bar of Texas under that state's new Sunset Act requiring it to
justify its existence or be abolished in 1979. Id. at 38-39; TEx. Rxv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-
1, § 2A (Vernon Supp. 1978). North Carolina's statutorily-created State Bar has similarly
been made subject to that state's Sunset Act and will be abolished effective July 1, 1979,
unless reprieved. 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 712, § 2.
1978] 287
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Already one challenge based on Abood has been filed. Allan
Falk, a commissioner for the Michigan Court of Appeals, is contend-
ing that the forced payment of dues to a unified bar under threat of
suspension from the practice of law is a parallel situation, and that
he should not be required to pay dues except to cover costs of the
bar's regulatory activities.'" Falk would like to see the state bar
dismantled and a genuine regulatory agency established to weed out
the incompetent and dishonest lawyers.' 7 Whether A bood will lead
to that end remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Many lawyers find this compulsory membership offensive ....
These feelings can and do engender as deep feelings as any other.'
It has been fifty-six years since unification of a state bar was
first adopted.'49 Since then challenges to unification have continued
unabated, and they appear to be gaining momentum,'5 as individ-
ual lawyers assert that the price of integration, in terms of loss of
freedom from court and peer control, is greater than any lawyer
ought to be willing to pay. 151
Admittedly, the state is vitally interested in the qualifications
and integrity of those practicing law within its borders, 52 but pri-
vate rights cannot arbitrarily be invaded or annihilated under the
mere guise of regulatory control.' Equally valid and important as
a fundamental principle is that, in a free society, one's beliefs and
associations should be shaped by one's mind and conscience, and
not coerced by the state.'54
The Montana supreme court has come perilously close to disre-
garding these principles in compelling all lawyers in the state to join
and contribute the State Bar of Montana as a condition to the
practice of law. The court relied on tenuous constitutional grounds'5
146. As reported in Woytash, supra note 145, at 33.
147. Id. at 34.
148. In re Unified New Hampshire Bar, 112 N.H., 204, 207, 291 A.2d 600, 602 (1972)
(Grimes, J., dissenting).
149. Woytash, supra note 145, at 33. North Dakota was the first state to integrate its
bar, doing so in 1921 by statute. 1921 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 25 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE.
§ 27-12-01).
150. Woytash, supra note 145, at 33.
151 This was the view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re Integration of the Bar,
249 Wis. 523, 531, 25 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1946), before it integrated its bar in 1956. In re
Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956).
152. Petition for Rule Activating, Integrating and Unifying the State Bar, 78 Tenn. 78,
83, 282 S.W.2d 782, 784 (1955).
153. Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 326, 215 P.2d 616, 621 (1950).
154. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
155. In re Adoption of Rule of Court for Unification of State Bar, 479 S.W.2d 225, 227
(Tenn. 1972) (Humphreys, J., concurring): "The case for unification is much weaker than the
[Vol. 39
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1978] COMPULSORY BAR DUES 289
to make its order, the first time a branch of Montana government
other than the legislature has imposed a license fee or tax. The court
has since then failed to supervise properly the agency it thus cre-
ated.
The danger is clear; for, as queried by James Madison:
Who does not see .. .[tihat the same authority which can force
a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?"6
The Montana supreme court should disestablish and disinte-
grate the State Bar of Montana.
case against it, viewed in the perspective of the competing constitutional powers of the
judiciary and the legislature."
156. I1 WRrTINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Hunt ed. 1901), as quoted in Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
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